The Maltese Civil Court (First Hall), presided over by Mr Justice Mark Simiana, has refused to recognise and enforce an Austrian court judgment against a Malta-licensed gaming operator, in a decision that provides important judicial clarification on the operation of Article 56A of the Gaming Act within the EU law framework and confirms the consistent approach of the Maltese courts in holding that Austrian gambling judgments are contrary to Maltese public policy within the meaning of Article 45 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation. The judgment was delivered on 30 January 2026 in proceedings brought by an Austrian player seeking recognition and enforcement in Malta of a 2022 decision of the Vienna Regional Civil Court. That foreign judgment had ordered the repayment of alleged gambling losses incurred on an online gaming platform licensed and regulated in Malta. Background to the proceedings The claimant relied on the Brussels I Recast Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, arguing that the Austrian judgment should be recognised and enforced in Malta following the abolition of exequatur procedures. The defendant, Virtual Digital Services Limited, opposed recognition, raising both procedural objections and substantive grounds under Articles 45 and 46 of the Regulation. Central to the defendant’s case was the argument that recognition of the foreign judgment would be manifestly contrary to Maltese public policy, and that enforcement would produce effects incompatible with Malta’s domestic legal order. During the pendency of the proceedings, Article 56A of the Gaming Act was enacted, and the Court considered its relevance as part of the applicable public policy framework governing recognition and enforcement. Limits of review under the Brussels I Recast Regulation As a preliminary matter, the Court emphasised that in proceedings for recognition or enforcement it is precluded from examining the merits of the foreign judgment. An examination of the Austrian decision showed that the compatibility of Austrian gambling law with EU law had already been considered and determined by the Austrian court — rightly or wrongly. Any attempt to re-argue that issue before the Maltese court was therefore inadmissible and irrelevant. The Court stressed that its task was not to reassess whether Austrian gambling legislation complied with EU law, but to determine whether recognition of the foreign judgment would, in itself, produce effects that are manifestly contrary to Malta’s public policy. This required an assessment of the impact that recognition would have on Malta’s domestic legal order. Impact on Maltese licences and fundamental EU freedoms In this regard, the Court observed that recognition of the Austrian judgment would have the immediate effect of undermining the legal force of a licence issued by the Malta Gaming Authority. By recognising the foreign judgment, Maltese law would give enforceable effect to a determination that the Maltese licence was ineffective for the provision of gaming services to Austrian players. Such an outcome, the Court held, would substantially interfere with the right of a Malta-licensed operator, lawfully established in an EU Member State, to provide services cross-border within the European Union. That right is one of the fundamental freedoms protected by EU law and forms part of the core legal framework recognised by the Maltese legal order. The decisive question was therefore whether the protection of that right forms part of Malta’s public policy. The Court answered that question in the affirmative. The crux of the Court’s reasoning: Article 56 TFEU and Article 56A At the heart of the judgment lies the Court’s finding that the right prejudiced by recognition of the foreign judgment is not merely a domestic or sector-specific interest, but a fundamental EU law right. The Court held that the right of a Malta-licensed operator to provide services in other Member States finds its legal basis in Article 56 TFEU, and that this same right is regarded by the Maltese State as essential and fundamental to its legal order. It is precisely this right that Article 56A of the Gaming Act seeks to protect as a matter of public policy. The Court found that recognition and enforcement of the Austrian judgment would seriously and irreversibly prejudice that right, by producing enforceable legal effects in Malta that negate the validity and effectiveness of a Maltese regulatory licence. In that sense, recognition of the foreign judgment would be contrary to Malta’s public policy, as both identified by the Court and expressly codified in Article 56A. The Court observed that, in the absence of EU legislation aimed at harmonising the gambling sector, each Member State remains free to regulate that sector within its own territory. Austria exercised that discretion when it legislated as it did, and Malta has exercised the same discretion through its own licensing and regulatory framework. The Court was careful to stress that it was not, and could not be, finding that Austrian gambling law is incompatible with EU law. Rather, its conclusion was confined to the effects of recognition. The recognition of a foreign judgment that fails to acknowledge the right of a Malta-licensed operator to provide services in another Member State would undermine an essential right forming part of the Maltese legal order and, for that reason, would be contrary to Malta’s public policy. Article 56A and its compatibility with EU law Against this background, the Court undertook a detailed examination of Article 56A of the Gaming Act. In a significant development for Maltese jurisprudence, it held that Article 56A is applicable in proceedings governed by the Brussels I Recast Regulation and that there was no basis to disapply it on grounds of incompatibility with EU law. The Court rejected the argument that Article 56A should be disapplied merely because it was enacted after the foreign judgment was delivered or after the proceedings had commenced. It held that the provision is procedural in nature and therefore applies to pending proceedings. The Court further held that the existence of infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission does not justify setting aside a law that remains validly in force. Crucially, the Court clarified that a domestic statute may be disapplied only where it is inconsistent with a hierarchically superior norm, whether constitutional, Convention-based or EU law. This explained why Article 56A had been disapplied in earlier cases concerning EU instruments that do not permit a public policy exception. By contrast, the Brussels I Recast Regulation expressly allows refusal of recognition on public order grounds. In that context, no inconsistency arises between Article 56A and EU law. The Court therefore found no valid basis to disapply Article 56A in the present proceedings. While similar conclusions had been reached in other recent First Hall judgments, appeals remain pending. For that reason, the Court considered it appropriate to conduct an autonomous assessment of the applicable principles rather than simply rely on prior decisions, ultimately reaching the same conclusion. The Court accordingly refused recognition and enforcement of the Austrian judgment in Malta. The decision reinforces the developing line of Maltese jurisprudence applying Article 45 of the Brussels I Recast Regulation to refuse recognition of foreign gambling judgments on public policy grounds, while providing the clearest judicial articulation to date of how Article 56A of the Gaming Act operates within the EU law framework. Dr Joseph Mizzi was counsel to Virtual Digital Services Limited in the proceedings.

Bad workmanship by a contractor (‘appaltatur’) is a common issue that frequently lands before the Maltese courts. Despite its regular occurrence, the law does not offer a one-size-fits-all remedy. Instead, it provides a flexible framework based on general principles of contract and obligations law. This article explores the most relevant remedies available when work falls short of expected workmanship and skills standards, and how to determine which is best suited to each situation. Breach of Contractually Agreed Quality – Rejecting the Works or Adjusting the Price Article 1390 of the Civil Code provides that: “If the thing which the seller offers to deliver is not of the quality promised, or is not according to the sample on which the sale was made, the buyer may elect either to reject the thing and demand damages, or to accept the thing with a diminution of the price upon a valuation by experts.” Although this article specifically addresses the sale of goods, Maltese courts have consistently applied it by analogy to contracts of work. This remedy provides two distinct paths, with the available course of action hinging on the injured party’s initial response. If the injured party accepts the work, their sole recourse is to request a price reduction proportional to the defects. Conversely, if the injured party rejects the work, they may pursue rescission of the contract, which releases them from payment obligations and allows them to claim damages, provided the work is returned unless doing so is physically impossible. The Court of Appeal, in John Mary Dalli nomine vs Grezzju Patiniott, decided on the 19th of May 2000, affirmed that the alternative avenues are not interchangeable and depend on the injured party’s immediate reaction. A party cannot keep the work while simultaneously refusing payment and demanding better results - you must choose your remedy early and act consistently. Similarly, one may keep the work whilst claiming damages. Monetary Compensation for Faulty Standards of Skill or Workmanship Where a contractor fails to meet expected standards, a claim may also be made under the broader rules on the effects of obligations in the Civil Code. Under Article 1125, often construed together with Article 1133, a contractor who fails to properly fulfil their obligations (whether by incomplete work, late delivery, or substandard quality) may be liable in damages, even without bad faith. In contrast to the avenue of default in contracted quality, provided under Article 1390,  the right to claim damages is independent of other remedies sought for the same bad workmanship, as it is considered an independent right to damages. This was most recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Karen Camilleri vs Emanuel Grech (decided on the 8th of May 2025). Compensated damages typically cover the value of remedial works required to correct the defects, and other damages that directly and immediately result from the faulty work. If fraud or bad faith is involved, the scope of recoverable damages may be broader, as long as a direct causal link is proven. In addition, Article 1127 allows the injured party to rectify the faults themselves (or hire someone else to do so), and charge the cost to the defaulting contractor in addition to damages sought, a useful option when one seeks remedial works as a remedy but does not trust the same contractor to fulfil such a task. Poor Workmanship as Breach of Resolutive Condition: Claiming Remedial Action or Termination of the Contract A contractor’s failure to deliver quality work is also seen as a breach of an implied resolutive condition under Article 1069 of the Civil Code. The premise of a resolutive condition is that the occurrence of an event, in this case the provision of substandard works, is a legal ground for contractual termination. The Court of Appeal recognised this principle in its judgment delivered on the 29th April 2016 in the names Mario Difesa et vs Jesmond Micallef et, confirming that good workmanship is an implied condition of any contract of work. A serious failure to meet this condition gives rise to specific remedies: The first is that of demanding the dissolution of the contract, extinguishing all obligations under it. The second is that of compelling the contractor to perform their obligation by remedying the fault in the works produced. Both remedies may be combined with a claim for damages grounded in the same remedy, offering flexibility depending on how the injured party wishes to proceed. Final Thoughts Maltese law offers a wide array of legal responses to bad workmanship - from rescinding the contract, to reducing the price, to claiming compensation or requiring rectification. The ideal remedy depends on several factors: How did you respond initially? What result are you seeking? How much time has passed? While these distinctions may seem overly technical to someone simply trying to obtain justice, choosing the correct legal avenue from the outset is critical. The wrong choice - or delay - may limit your options or affect the outcome of your case.